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Agriculture is  emerging as  a  key  issue  in  the political  economy
of  international  trade.  Because  its international  status
cannot  be divorced  from domestic  farm programs,  foreign trade
officials  and others  in  the diplomatic  community  are being
forced  to confront complex  issues  of agricultural policy.  As
Italian foreign minister Giuilo Andreotti  lamented during  a
1988 debate  over European  Community agricultural  spending,  "I
sit  there  talking about  soybeans,  and  I don't  even know what
the miserable  things  look  like."
The complexity of  agricultural  protectionism has  for  many years
served as  a  barrier  to popular  and political  understanding.
This  lack  of  understanding has  been useful  to the  special
interests that  benefit  most from this protection, and  has
allowed a  variety  of myths  to continue  to surround  the  farm
sector.  Until  fairly  recently, the  inconsistencies,
inefficiencies,  and lack  of  fairness which  riddle farm policy
were subjects  of  interest  to  a  relatively small  group of
agricultural policy specialists.  As  President Kennedy
reputedly told his principal  agricultural policy  advisor:  "I
don't want  to  hear about agriculture from anyone  but you...Come
to  think  of  it,  I don't want to  hear  about  it  from you
either."
As  long as  the costs  of  farm programs were  low and foreign
markets  for surpluses were  growing, attention  lagged  in
capitals and international  economic fora.  But  in  the mid
1980s,  budget costs  for  agriculture rose  dramatically in  both
the U.S.  and  Europe.  Shrinking foreign demand  led to  falling
farm incomes,  yet price  support programs  continued  to pay
farmers  far more than the market for  their products.  In  recent
years, these costs  soared in  both the U.S.  and  Europe to  over
25  billion dollars annually, and  still  failed to prevent  a
record number  of  farm bankrupcies.  In  a desperate  attempt to
unload surplus production, export subsidies were used to  dump
grain and  other  commodities  on world markets,  lowering prices
and  threatening a global agricultural trade war.  The  result
was  increasing international  attention to  the problems of
agriculture.
No where  is  this  attention more apparent  than  in  the ongoing
multilateral debate  in  the  General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade  (GATT) in Geneva.  This  debate is  part of  a  larger  effort- 2 -
to  reform the global  trading  system.  The  reform effort,  while
difficult and slow moving, has  been given new urgency by
economic stresses  reflected  in  national debt  burdens, large
trade deficits  and  surpluses, and stock  and exchange market
instabilities.  The  thesis  of  this  essay is  that much needed
reform  in agricultural policies will  be  the cornerstone  of
broader attempts at  trade liberalization and  reform under
GATT.  If  these attempts fail,  the  consequences for  world
markets and global  economic growth may be quite  serious.
It  follows  that agriculture must  now take a central place  in
the  development of United  States foreign  trade policy.  If  this
policy  is  to be  liberal,  rather  than protectionist,  it  will
demand greater market orientation in  both domestic and foreign
agriculture,  reducing  the distortions and protectionism that
now separate domestic  from global markets  in many nations.
Closing  this  gap will  require more general  understanding of  the
domestic causes  of agricultural  trade distortion.  It will  also
require  the political  courage  to discard certain myths  that
have protected ineffective and  out-of-date  agricultural
policies  from reform.  Finally, it  will  require coordinated,
multilateral efforts  to  rationalize domestic agricultural
policies  through  international agreements.  Without  such
efforts, agricultural  trade disputes may incite global
protectionism and  stagnating  growth.  Renewing growth  through
trade, while  important  to the  recession-prone OECD economies,
is  even more important  to developing countries, where
agriculture  remains the  foundation of  economic progress.
I
Until  the most  recent  round  of  trade  talks,  launched at  Punta
del Este,  Uruguay  in  September,  1986,  farm programs  had  been
treated  as  a notable exception  to  trade policy rules.  The
Uruguay Round,  the eighth multilateral trade negotiation  (MTN)
since World War  II,  is  the  first  to  take aim at  a wide  variety
of  thorny agricultural  trade barriers  based in  domestic  farm
policies.  This eighth round of GATT  talks confronts  a legacy
of  failure in  previous  rounds to  stem the  rising tide  of
nontariff  protection and special waivers granted to agriculture.
Prior  to the  Uruguay Round, largely at  the  insistence of the
United States,  the  European  Community, and  Japan, agriculture
was treated under  GATT as  a special case,  immune from  the
principles  of  trade liberalization  that  have  otherwise guided
the  General Agreement.  So special was the  case of  agriculture
that  it  largely escaped  the discipline of  the  basic principles
on which  the GATT is  founded.  These are  (1) nondiscrimination
and  reciprocity in  trade;  (2) protection through measures  that
are  "transparent,"  in  the  sense  that  they can be easily
measured and monitered;  (3) the establishment  of  "bound"  levels- 3 -
of protection through negotiation;  and  (4) notification,
consultation  and arbitration  in  the event  of  disputes.
Despite attempts to  bring agriculture  under GATT  rules  in  the
Kennedy Round  (1963-67) and the  Tokyo Round  (1973-79) of
negotiations,  it  would not  be an  exaggeration to  say  that  since
World War  II,  trade  in  agriculture has  become more
discriminatory, less  transparent,  less  bound, and  less  subject
to multilateral  consultation and negotiation.  Although the
basic principles of nondiscrimination and  reciprocity  expressed
in Articles  I and  II  of  the  GATT were  intended  to apply to
agricultural and  nonagricultural  trade  alike, agriculture has
escaped from the prohibitions against quantitative  import and
export restrictions under  Article  XI,  and  against export
subsidies under  Article XVI.  In  addition to general  exceptions
granted to  agriculture  under  these  GATT articles, the United
States demanded and  received special treatment  under  a 1955
waiver  that allows quantitative import  restrictions on products
affected by domestic price  supports.  Without  this waiver,  it
would be  impossible to  reconcile United  States obligations  to
nondiscrimination with domestic agricultural support measures
that  require  import fees  and quotas,  authorized  under Section
22  of  the Agricultural Adjustment Act  of  1933,  the law
underlying  U.S.  farm programs. 1
This maze of  restrictions and  waivers make the U.S.  case  for
trade  liberalization in  other  areas of  GATT more difficult, and
is  in  itself  a cause of  distortions in  world trade  flows.  But
the  United States  is  hardly alone.  Other contracting parties
to  the  GATT engage  is  a wide  array of nontariff  agricultural
protection that  is  neither transparent  nor widely understood.
Even before  the Dillon Round  (1960-61)  of  negotiations,  the
formation  in  1958 of  the  Common Agricultural  Policy  (CAP) of
the European  Community  (EC)  made  it  necessary to  grant Europe
the  right  to  replace national  tariffs with common border
measures,  including  "variable  levies"  on  imports  to help shore
up domestic prices  in  what was  then a large  net  importing
region of  the world.  With continued  economic expansion and
increasingly generous  farm subsidies,  however, Europe emerged
in  the  1970s as an  agricultural exporter, and export subsidies
("restitutions") were used  to  dispose of  its mounting
surpluses.  In  addition  to  the  U.S.  and E.C.,  Japan has  evolved
a complex  set  of  customs  duties, import quotas, and  other
border measures,  combined with  direct government payments  to
producers and  a wide array of  other  domestic  subsidies,
designed  especially to protect its  rice market.
Together,  the agricultural protectionism of  the U.S.,  E.C.  and
Japan puts each of  these  major capitalist economies  in  the
difficult position of  seeking  to enlarge the  scope  and level  of
world trade,  while continually pleading  that  their agricultural- 4 -
producers could not  sustain greater  trade liberalization.  This
position  is often  skillfully exploited in  GATT by  developing
countries,  such as  India  and Brazil,  that desire  access  to  U.S.
markets yet wish  to protect  certain  sectors  of  their  own  from
developed  country competition.  Even  the  few agricultural
measures  that  are bound under  GATT,  such as  the guaranteed
access of  U.S.  soybean shipments to  Europe  (the  "zero duty
binding"),  are  under  steady attack by  those who would seek  to
raise additional barriers  to access.  (Ironically, in  the  case
of soybeans,  this attack  is  made  by Europeans  otherwise
commited  to liberalizing  the  internal  European market, which  is
claimed to  require  "closing the  CAP"  to soybean  imports.)
Finally,  the consultation and dispute settlement process  in
GATT is  weak,  and has  often led  the parties  to  revert to
bilateral  retaliation due  to the  failure  to  gain satisfactory
settlement  of  disputes under the  system of  GATT panels
established for  the purpose.  The  most notable examples  of
these bilateral disputes  in  recent years have  been in
agriculture.
In  the face  of  increasing cynicism in political and  private
sector  circles  over  the capacity  of GATT successfully to
resolve  these  issues,  in  July,  1987  the United States  launched
what amounts to a make or  break proposition  for international
agricultural policy reform.  The  proposal  startled many  jaded
trade negotiators by  stating that  GATT's contracting parties
should eliminate all  trade-distorting forms of  domestic  support
to  farmers  over  a period of  ten years.
This  proposal, which  in Geneva was dubbed the  "double zero
option,"  dramatically indicated  U.S.  resolve  to stop treating
agriculture as  a special  case.  While careful provision was
made  to allow direct payments  to  farmers  as  a  "safety net,"  all
forms  of  support  that encourage  production in excess of market
demand would  be eliminated.  In  essence, the proposal  would
shift  the  target of  agricultural policy from supporting  farm
prices  to supporting  farm income.  In  the  jargon used by  the
agricultural policy community, payments  to  farmers would  be
unrelated  to specific crops and planting  requirements, and
hence  "decoupled"  from production.  Farmers could  still  receive
direct income  support,  but would  be  free to grow whatever  crops
were in  market  demand.
While roundly condemned as  "unrealistic"  by  the European
Community and Japan, the proposal was  endorsed  in  principle  by
a variety  of  exporters and importers  for whom the U.S./E.C.
subsidy wars  of  the mid-1980s had brought nothing but  low
prices and  stagnant demand.  The  most notable  impact  was  to  add
strength to a loose  confederation of  countries, known  as  the
"Cairns Group,"  which had been a key  force  in  bringing
agriculture into the  Uruguay Round.  It  also stimulated  the- 5 -
E.C.  and  Japan  to develop their  own proposals  (which
essentially defended  the status quo, while  admitting  that short
term relief was called for),  and helped other  countries  to
develop more comprehensive agricultural policy options.  These
proposals are  now on  the  table  in  Geneva, awaiting  serious
negotiations.
In December,  1988,  trade ministers will  meet  in  Montreal  for  a
"mid-term review" of  progress  in  the Uruguay Round.  This
review will set the  tone and direction for the  subsequent
negotiationg process.  With  the approach  of  the mid-term
review, pressure  increases  to go  beyond general statements and
to  commit  to actual measures of liberalization  as  a
"downpayment" on the  final  agreement hoped for  in  1990.  Yet
despite  the  desire to  move forward  at mid-term, many
governments are  politically shy of  committing  too early in  the
game.  In part,  this shyness  is  a  result  of  overlapping
European and U.S.  political pressures.  The  French presidential
election  in  May,  1988,  followed by  the U.S.  nominating
conventions and  elections, lead  both French and U.S.
politicians to protect themselves  from charges of
"appeasement".  No  European politician desires to  appear  soft
in defending  farmers who have profited  handsomely from E.C.
policy, and  newly elected French politicians will  have  few
incentives  to bargain seriously with a  lame duck  U.S.
administration.  Because  of  its  central  role  in  the  EC, French
intransigence will  affect  the willingness of European ministers
to  bargain seriously in  Montreal  and beyond.
These political pressures  yield deep pessimism  in  some  circles
over  the ability truly to  liberalize agricultural  trade  through
multilateral negotiation.  Added in  evidence  is  the fact  that
the European Community achieved  a  seeming budget compromise
over  agricultural  spending in February, 1988.  While  offering
no  real prospects  for  reduced export subsidies or  enhanced
budget discipline  (a leading West German agricultural  economist
dismissed  it  as  "a drop of  water on  a hot  stone")  the
arrangement  nonetheless equips  the E.C.  to avoid reforming  the
CAP for several  more years, while demanding  "credit"  in  GATT
for essentially cosmetic short  term efforts to  reduce  the  level
of  agricultural  production.  These efforts  include modest price
cuts  in  the event  that  production exceeds a predetermined
ceiling, together  with  "set-asides"  of agricultural  land.
However,  the price cuts  have a variety of  escape clauses, and
the  "ceiling"  of  160 million metric  tons  of  grain  is  less
impressive when it  is noted  that  the figure  is  seven million
tons greater  than production in  1987.  In  the face  of
pessimists  at  home,  U.S.  negotiators must  thus also confont  a
Europe seemingly more able to finance a continuation of  the
status quo abroad.- 6 -
Despite  these  obstacles,  it  is  evident  that  the next  president
and administration will  inherit  a set of  chronic agricultural
policy problems, with interlocking domestic and  foreign
elements.  The  Chairman of  the Senate Agriculture Committee,
Patrick  Leahy,  has  emphasized that  if  progress  in  the Uruguay
Round  is  not  forthcoming,  the  House and Senate are more  than
prepared  to draft a highly protectionist Farm Bill  in  1990,  the
effect  of  which would be  to  restart  the subsidy wars of  the
1980s.  It  is  the midterm  review in Montreal that will  give the
Congress  its  first  clear  signal whether progress  is
achievable.  An  opportunity now exists to  evaluate and  appraise
the  remarkable assault on  agricultural protectionism that  has
been proposed  in  Geneva, to  determine why this  battle should be
fought, and  whether  it will be  won.
II.
Before examining the prospects  for trade  policy reform,  it  is
useful  to  ask  why agriculture has  for  so  long been considered  a
special  case,  immune from the  liberalization that has  been
applied  to  other  sectors  under  GATT.  Many who  defend  it  as  a
special  case claim that  farm and  food production are  too
important to be  left  to market  forces,  and  that without
substantial government manipulation, the  food and  fiber
production system would fail.  This  argument has  several
subthemes, including the  strong emotional  bond between farmers
and  society as  a whole, the  political  influence of  farm groups,
and broader concerns  with  "food  security,"  which  are often  used
to  suggest  that artificial price  supports  and self-sufficiency
are preferable to  the  caprice of markets  and  international
trade in assuring  supply.
While some  degree of  food and income  security  in agriculture  is
undoubtedly appropriate,  there are few who would argue that
current programs  do not  need improvement.  When  the production
of  the United States, Europe and Japan achieved  levels  in  1985
leading to world stocks  of grains  almost twice the  levels of
consumption,  it  suggested that  government encouragement  to  grow
crops may have been overdone.  Of  course,  the welfare  of  farm
families is  a social as well  as an  economic  judgement.  Many
compassionate citizens  are  struck  by  the plight of  heavily
indebted  small  farmers,  and imagine  that  the answer  lies  in
additional  government price supports.  Yet  the evidence, after
over  fifty years of  such  transfers,  is  that domestic  farm
programs  based on  guaranteed prices paid on a per  acre basis
are  increasingly  skewed in  favor  of  large  farmers, who are  then
in  a stronger  position to gobble up  their neighbors.
In  short, when payments  are made on  the basis of  acres  in
production, as  they are  in  both the United States and  under  the
European  CAP,  there  is  a powerful  incentive to acquire  and- 7 -
plant more acres.  The  bigger the  farm,  the bigger  the
payment.  The  complexity of  agricultural  programs has  served  as
a  smokescreen for  these  transfers,  allowing them to  be
defended,  despite their  extreme  regressivity, as salvation  for
the  "family farm."  In  fact,  the evidence  suggests the
opposite:  government price  supports have  speeded  the demise  of
smaller farming operations  and  thus  increased the  rate  of  rural
unemployment.
These programs have also reduced the  level  of diversification
typical  of traditional  agriculture.  In  the United  States, farm
enterprises are paid by  the government  to produce  a selected
number  of  "supported"  commodities,  including rice, cotton,
corn, wheat,  soybeans, barley,  oats, dairy and  tobacco.
Roughly 80  percent of  these payments  are made  to  fewer  than  20
percent of  the nation's  farmers.  These farmers respond
rationally to  the incentives provided by price  guarantees  in  a
relatively few  commodities:  they  specialize  in  the supported
crops.  Often,  they produce little else,  since specialized
monoculture with government price  guarantees  is  nearly always
preferable  to diversification.  (In  contrast, the  uncertainty
of  the market  demands diversification to assure  survival.)
"Program crops"  are produced  intensively,  utilizing large
quantitites of pesticides,  fertilizer,  and other  inputs.  This
intensive production is  expensive  to  the  farmer,  and  encourages
the  acquisition of  large  levels  of  debt  to purchase additional
land,  equipment, fertilizer  and  chemicals.  It  is  also
expensive  to society, since  it  encourages cultivation practices
that  lead to erosion  and chemical pollution of  lakes,  streams,
and  the underground water  of  local  communities.
The sources  of  trade policy conflict  are  directly rooted  in
these  domestic price  support programs, which create  surpluses
that  must find  foreign outlets.  Ironically, many  of  the
supported crops  are already  in  excess supply, and  cannot  be
profitably sold.  Hence,  the government  stands  ready to  acquire
them in  lieu of  repayment of  loans taken out  (at subsidized
interest)  in  order  to plant them in  the first place.  After
surrendering these  crops  to government  storage,  farmers  receive
a  "deficiency payment"  for  their  effort.  In  recent years,
market prices have  been so weak that  huge quantities  of  the
program commodities have entered government warehouses, and
deficiency payments  have accounted  for  a larger  and  larger
share  of  net  farm income.  USDA's 1986 National  Financial
Summary  indicates that  total government payments as  a
percentage of  net  farm income from all sources  rose  from six
percent  in  1980 to  26 percent  in  1984, and  to  31.5 percent  in
1986.  For  many individual  farmers, the percentage  is  much
higher, making  them utterly dependent on  a system that
continues  to  reward the production  of  commodities  that nobody
wants.  Despite  attempts by  USDA to pay  farmers  in  kind  through- 8 -
a  form of  fiat currency  ("Payment  in  Kind Certificates"),  the
budget outlays for  these programs have been enormous.  Total
agricultural program spending in  1986  exceeded twenty five
billion dollars,  up almost eightfold  from the highest  level
achieved  in  the 1970s.  It  is  little wonder  that many farmers
cynically  refer  to  "farming the government,"  as  more profitable
than plowing  their  fields.
While different  in  design, the  policies of  the  European Common
Agricultural Policy(CAP)  have  the  same effect.  By paying
prices  far  in excess  of world  market  levels and allowing
European farmers  to sell  surpluses  to  the  E.C.,  the CAP has
accumulated staggering quantities of agricultural commodities.
The EC  then exports these surpluses  under  "export restitutions"
by covering  the difference  between the  internal  EC price  and
the world price.  A particularly absurd result  of  these
policies has  been recent  European Community purchase  of  surplus
low grade butter, which  is  then disposed of  by feeding  it  to
calves.
In  both the U.S.  and Europe,  a major part of  "farming  the
government"  involves being paid  not to  farm at  all.  In
response to  a persistent pattern of  surplus production,
programs  have evolved that  require farmers growing program
crops to  remove a  certain proportion of  their  corn acreage,  for
example, from corn  (and generally  from other  surplus
commodities)  in order to  receive a  deficiency payment.  These
"set  asides"  amount  to attempts  to  hit  the production control
brakes while  simultaneously pressing the price  support
accelerator.  Again,  farmers respond rationally,  by diverting
those  acres which are  least productive.  As a  result,  the
brakes slip.  Experience has  shown that  from two to  three acres
must be diverted  in  order  to  reduce output by  the yield  of  an
"average" acre.  Acres  left  in production, meanwhile, are
farmed more  intensively than ever,  raising both yields  and the
level  of  environmental damage.  Proposals  to make such programs
mandatory,  in  effect shutting down millions of  acres of
productive land,  have recently been endorsed by  "supply
control"  advocates both  in  the U.S.  and  Europe, although the
failed record  of existing programs  raises major questions
concerning their  feasibility.
Spurred on  by price supports  as much as  four times world prices
for  some  commodities, both the  European  Community and United
States  have accounted  for the  lion's share  of  world  surplus
production.  At  the end  of  1987,  the EC  held over  1 million
metric  tons  of  surplus butter,  708,000  tons of  surplus skimmed
milk powder,  725,000  tons of  beef  and more  than 10  million tons
of  cereals  in  Community  stores.
2 The  estimated cost  of  total
E.C.  agricultural  spending  in  1987  is  27  billion ECU's,  up  from
22 billion  in  1986,  of which  7.4  billion went  to  export- 9 -
subsidies,  and  4.4  billion for  storage of  surpluses.  At  the
beginning of  1988,  the Commodity Credit Corporation, the  U.S.
Deparetment of Agriculture's  surplus purchaser,  owned  3 billion
bushels of  grain of  its  own, and paid storage fees  on  another
2.3  billion bushels held on  farms,  at  a cost of  $2.5  billion in
storage costs  alone.
These data do  not  capture the  losses of  other  trading nations
due  to  the price and  income  effects of  surpluses on world
markets.  In  addition to  taxpayers  in  the U.S.  and  E.C.(for
whom relatively cheap food  is  some  compensation),  the obvious
losers have been poor farmers  in  developing countries, where
earnings from crop production have been driven to  new lows  by
the  subsidy wars of  the North.  The only unambiguous  winners
have  been grain  importers, notably  the Soviet  Union, who have
played the Western allies off  against each  other  to  receive
absurdly  low subsidized prices.  So  cheap is  the  grain bought
by  the  Soviets that  they have been able  to  buy more than they
need and then  "donate"  it  to poor  countries  in  the South,
making  the United States  seem niggardly  in  the  bargain.
When criticisms  of  these policies  are made,  it  is  typically  in
the context  of  the need for  more aid and  assistance  targeted to
financially strapped, diversified, environmentally benign
"small  farmers."  Yet  as  noted above, the pattern of  assistance
to agriculture, especially  in  the United States and the
European  Community, has primarily benefitted large, specialized
farms,  contributing to the  elimination of  the diversified
producer.  To many  (including many  farmers)  the  culprit  is  a
system  in which  cropping decisions are  excessively manipulated
through government-administered prices and  acreage  retirement
schemes,  rather  than allowed  to  reflect the  forces  of  supply
and demand.  It  bears emphasis  that moving  in a more
market-oriented direction does not  imply  that  farm income would
be abandoned as  an object  of policy.  Rather  than the  indirect
object  of price supports coupled  to specific crops,  it  would
become the  direct object of  income payments.  It  is
increasingly  clear that  farm income security  cannot be
accomplished through price supports which create  incentives to
plant  too many acres  of  too  few varieties of  crops, far  in
excess  of market  demand.
Despite  the dubious  record of  farm programs'  achievement,
domestic political pressures have been  insufficient  to  force
needed changes.  It  is  for  this  reason that the  international
attention focussed on  agriculture in  GATT emerges as  so
important.  While  the general public  remains largely unaware of
the failure of  farm programs, and often assumes that  farm
bankrupcies  result  from too little  in  the way of  price
supports,  large payments  to large producers  continue to  insure
well-organized lobbying  and campaign  contribution efforts by- 10  -
farming's big  boys.  The  lobbies defending  these programs,
organized commodity by  commodity, are tenaciously attached  in
Washington  to  the  subcommittees that  determine the  levels  of
price  support.  As  long as  farm policy  is  formulated on  a
commodity  by commodity  basis,  rather  than as  across-the-board
farm income payments, the  subcommittee system will assure
Congressional  pressure  to  keep these  prices high.  Price
support programs  appeal  to  the local  politics  of congressional
districts dependent  on particular  crops,  rather  than on  broader
policy and  trade objectives.
Breaking this  hold on the public purse would be an  important
consequence of  direct income supports paid  to  farm families now
being called for  in GATT.  Although direct  income  supports
could be  expensive, they would at  least  be transparent,  rather
than hidden,  transfers.  While often criticized  as no more  than
welfare, such  transfers are  clearly superior  to  the  current
system--which  is worse  than welfare--in  the sense  that  the
biggest farms  get  the biggest payments.  There  is,  moreover, no
reason that  farm income  supports should not  be  tied to
increased obligations  to  improve the  rural environment,
converting  a one-way payment  into an  exchange of  income
security for a variety of  social and  environmental benefits.
This  relationship  is particularly significant  in  Europe, where
environmental  damages from farming  are major political  issues.
In  contrast, price support programs  have been disguised
transfers  that protect domestic  agricultural  constituencies
from market forces with  little scrutiny  from taxpayers,  and
even less  regard for  their  environmental and  global  trade
effects.  With all  of  their domestic  failings,  it  is  these
global effects that have emerged  from the sidelights  to  take
center stage in  the  GATT.  Farm policy, especially as  world
markets have  become  increasingly integrated,  is more and more
difficult  to separate  from trade policy. 3
III.
When considered from an  international perspective, however,
American agriculture appears less  a problem than a leading
sector  in beating foreign competition, which  if  unshackled from
many government  programs that  misdirect the  allocation of
resources, could be even more  competitive over  time.  As  an
example  of  this misallocation  consider  programs which  encourage
dairy production  on factory-like farms  in  the deserts of
Arizona,  through arcane  "milk marketing orders" which  support
prices  in  inverse proportion to  the distance  from Eau Claire,
Wisconsin.  Minnesota farmers,  meanwhile, are encouraged by
sugar  price  supports  400%  above world prices  to  grow sugar
beets  rather  than graze dairy cattle.  The  losers are  poor
producers in  the  Caribbean,  for whom the U.S.  sugar program
makes  the  "Carribean Basin  Initiative"  a grim joke.- 11  -
The  advantages of  U.S.  agriculture are  enormous, but  not  so
great  that they cannot be  squandered through misdirected
policies.  North America  is  one  of  the world's great
breadbaskets, united by  temperate climates,  rich  soils,  and
advanced  farm skills and technology.  Vernon Ruttan, one  of  the
foremost  students of  agricultural technology  change, describes
it  as  "one  of  the nation's  last  indisputable world class
industries."  While a  few might argue that  this  results  from
government price supports,  the underlying  causes are  rapid
productivity gains  fueled by public  and private  sector
research.  (Whether this  research constitutes  an  implicit
export subsidy will  no  doubt arise in  the  context of  the U.S.
proposal  in GATT.)  Over  the  last  25  years, productivity gains
greater than  in  any other  sector  of  comparable  size  have made
U.S.  farm products  highly competitive in foreign markets.
These  markets, especially in  developing countries,  increasingly
underpin prosperity  in  the Farm Belt.  From 1962-1971,  an
average of  49.5 percent of  U.S.  wheat, 13.0 percent  of U.S.
corn, and  31.1 percent of  U.S.  soybeans flowed  into
international trade.  From 1971-1983,  these proportions
increased to  58.4 percent  for wheat,  27.0 percent  for  corn, and
39.4  percent for  soybeans.  The  land  area planted  to  these
three crops  increased 54  percent between  1970 and  1981,  while
their  farm production value  increased by  50  percent.  There  is
substantial evidence  that without the export market,  the
sickening skid  in  farm land prices  of  the  last  few years would
have been even worse.  Like many other U.S.  industries, the
American  heartland  is  heavily trade-dependent. 4
This  increased dependence  on foreign markets  emerged in  the
1970s when global  shortages  appeared to  guarantee unlimited
demand for  U.S.  farm products.  Major grain sales  to  the  Soviet
Union and to  LDCs were accompanied by what one  observer  termed
the  "scarcity  syndrome."  Despite enormous quantities  of  arable
acreage and rapid progress  in yield-increasing technologies,
food  and the  land required to produce  it  were declared  by a
variety of  research  centers equiped with  "global forecasting
models"  to be  absolutely scarce.  To increase production for  a
hungry world,  investments in  land,  farm machinery,  irrigation
equipment,  and  other  rural  infrastructure seemed easily
justifiable  to  farmers and bankers  alike.  Farm land and  other
inputs were bid  up  in price,  reinforcing  the  cycle of  bullish
expectations.  If  the  capital gains resulting  from land price
increases were not  in  themselves  enough to  justify  these
investments,  government price  supports reinforced  them by
taking the  risk  out  of grain growing.  High government price
supports were politically painless as  long as  export demand
continued  to support the market.
Beginning in  1980-81,  however,  in  the  face of  recession  and
growing  LDC debt,  foreign demand  for  grain crops began a steep- 12  -
decline.  As  foreign demand declined,  land, machinery and  other
fixed investments could not  be.removed from production as
rapidly  as  they had been brought  on  line.  Instead,  they fell
in price,  setting off  a commodity and  land market  bust which
matched the  boom of  the  1970s.  The  "farm crisis"  of  the  1980s
was the  result.  Both  in  the  Farm Belt  and  in  LDCs  around the
world,  bank  loans made on  the basis of  commodities price
bullishness  turned sour.  By  the  early 1980s,  the problem
seemed not  too little grain but  too much.  Barbara  Insel,
writing in  these  pages in  1985, deplored a "world awash in
grain,"  and  raised the disconcerting possibility that an
agricultural production juggarnaught might  swamp us  in  our  own
abundance.5
In  the face  of  this  overproduction, both the  U.S.  and E.C.
turned to export subsidies  as  a way of  ridding themselves  of
unwanted surpluses,  setting  in  train a subsidy war  that  lowered
grain prices  worldwide.  While entrenched agricultural
interests  in  the North demanded  and  received price supports
well above world market  levels,  stimulating chronic excess
production,  in developing  economies  urban elites grown used to
subsidized  food  received low prices at  the  expense of  rural
producers.  The overproduction  of  the North flowed at  subsidy
onto world markets, keeping prices low and  destroying the
incentives of poor farmers  in  the  South, while  the bins  and
budgets of  the North bulged.
While global surpluses have been unprecedented  in  the  last
three years,  there  is  evidence  that the  tide  is  again  turning,
as  acreage retirements  and other government policies  restrict
supplies.  As  this  cycle recurs,  it  is  inceasingly clear  that
instability in world agriculture  is  only modestly the  result of
natural  interruptions, and  is primarily the  consequence of
government  policies.  Excess supply,  resulting from
artificially high  domestic prices paid to  farmers, has  been
followed by massive programs  of land  retirement,  as governments
slam on  the acreage control brakes.  In  the United States
alone, over  75 million acres has been removed  in  order  to  slow
the accumulation  of  stocks and  reduce  "budget exposure".
The perception of senseless waste surrounding agricultural
policy is now so  serious from both a domestic and  international
perspective  that  a major assault  on agricultural  protectionism
is  a fundamental part  of  the Uruguay Round.  Agriculture needs
the attention of  the Uruguay Round, but  to succeed,  the Uruguay
Round needs progress  in  agriculture, which will affect  the
entire pace and pattern of  the negotiation.  The premise of  the
negotiations  is  that domestic  agricultural  adjustment programs,
when practiced by large exporters  or  importers, spill  over  into
international  trade.  The conclusion has been  forced on major
agricultural  traders  that  the sector  can no  longer be  allowed- 13  -
to  be granted  special dispensation from reform.  If  the  reform
effort underway  in  Geneva fails,  there are  powerful political
interests on both  sides of  the Atlantic prepared to  take  up
positions for a long,  costly and ultimately dangerous
agricultural  subsidy war.
IV.
What direction will  GATT reform  in  agriculture take,  if  it
takes at  all?  On  the one hand,  there  are countries and
interests that will  seek  a global  system of  "managed
agricultural  trade,"  analogous to  domestic attempts  to
manipulate supply and demand.  In  contrast to  these dirigistes,
U.S.  negotiators  have argued that  the  global agricultural
economy  is  too  complex to direct,  and  that  the  rules  and
disciplines of  GATT should be extended  to allow greater
market-orientation  in agriculture.  It  is  useful,  in  the
context of  these  polar positions, briefly to examine  the
proposals  for agricultural  trade reform that  have been put
forward in  Geneva,  since their  success  or  failure  will serve  as
harbingers  of  policy reform in  the United  States and Europe in
the 1990's and beyond.
The  poles described above provide  a basic orientation, from
complete  liberalization to  the  "managed trade"  approach.  At
the polar position of  complete  liberalization stands the United
States.  The U.S.  has  advocated eliminating all  tariff and
non-tariff barriers,  including trade-distorting  health and
sanitary measures,  all  export subsidies,  and all  domestic
measures which affect trade  over  a ten year period.  Only  food
aid  and "decoupled" domestic  programs which do  not affect
output would  be permitted at  the  end of  this period.  The  U.S.
proposes  that  the contracting parties  put  forward and then
"bind"  commitments  to phase  out  specific policies,  utilizing  an
agreed measure of  overall  levels  of  support  to  help moniter
progress.  This  "double zero option"  is  clearly the most
unadulterated call  for  liberalization, and  represents a major
change from the way world agriculture  (especially U.S.  and
European programs)  are  currently conducted.  The  U.S. proposal
carries the  strategic advantage  of  consistency and high
purpose, while  underscoring  how far  the U.S.  and  many of  its
trading partners would have to go  in  order  to meet  such
commitments.  Despite  its  effectiveness as  an opening  gambit,
the distance  from the proposal to  current  reality has  not  been
lost  on current beneficiaries of  farm programs,  nor on  our
negotiating opposites.
The  Cairns Group proposal  (and a separate but essentially
similar proposal  by Canada,  a Cairns member),  reflect  a similar
resolve  to move  radically toward greater market-orientation  in
agriculture.  The group  is  notable for  including both- 14  -
exporters,  importers, developed and developing  countries:
Australia, New  Zealand,  Canada, Argentina,  Uruguay, Brazil,
Thailand, Hungary,  Chile, Colombia,  Indonesia, Malaysia,  and
the  Philippines.  Like  the U.S.  the Cairns Group calls  for
eventual elimination of  all  domestic  subsidies and  border
measures with trade distorting effects.  Unlike  the U.S.
proposal, however,  it  has  called for  a set  of early  relief
measures  representing a  "downpayment" on  the eventual package.
This downpayment  includes  freezes on  border measures  which
restrict  market access and production subsidies  affecting
trade,  followed by an across-the-board reduction  of  a fixed
percentage on all  export and production subsidies and
commitments to open market  access.  Following early  relief,  the
Cairns proposal calls for  a phase down of measured support
levels  by each country according to a national schedule  in
which priority attention  is  given  to  the most trade-distorting
measures.  While  its  implementation  schedule is  more explicit
than  the U.S.  proposal,  its objectives are  similarly liberal:  a
new framework of GATT rules  that would eliminate all  import and
export  restrictions and all  domestic  subsidies with an  impact
on trade.  Only measures  for  infrastucture improvement,
disaster  relief,  and  "decoupled" direct  income support  to
farmers and consumers would  be allowed.
At  the other pole of  the  debate, the  European Community
proposal  focuses heavily on  short-term actions to  correct
supply-demand  imbalances  in  high surplus commodities  in  the
E.C.  such  as  sugar,  dairy, and cereals.  Reflecting Brussels'
internal concern with maintaining the  CAP  in essentially its
present  form  (including its system of  export  subsidies and
price supports),  the proposal  envisages one year  "emergency"
commitments  to reduce  cereals prices,  sugar  exports,  and
production in other  surplus sectors,  followed by longer  term
measures  in which protection for  some  sectors might  actually be
increased  (notably in  soybeans).  This  second stage would
involve  new GATT rules  on  the  conditions for  the application of
subsidies, demand-increasing measures, the  role of
state-trading, and other  issues.  Direct income  supports have
been acknowledged  by the  E.C.  as  a long term objective,  though
with  little enthusiasm.
From the U.S.  perspective, the  E.C. proposal  offers little or
nothing  in  the  way of  liberalization, and  could easily  lead to
much  less  liberal  trade.  U.S.  reactions to  the proposal noted
that  it mistakes  surpluses  for the  problem, rather  than as  a
symptom of  underlying price support  levels which are too high.
The essential philosophy of  the proposal  is  managed trade,  in
which  the divorce of  domestic and  international prices
underlying the  CAP  is  extended  to encompass  the  rest  of  the
world.  The  CAP itself, often pointed to by the E.C.  as  the
greatest  achievement  in market  integration by  the  Community,  is- 15  -
not  nominated  for  major reform.  While this vision of  trade
reform has  the virtue of  "realism,"  in  the  sense  that  it
departs  little from business  as usual,  it has been  roundly
condemned by  both the U.S.  and  Cairns Group, and  by developing
countries who  forsee a  "managed" solution  as  of primary benefit
to the  exporters of  the North,  and  not to  the poorer nations  of
the  South.
The  fourth major proposal  tabled in Geneva  comes from Japan.
While  not a contributor  to  the  export subsidy wars,  Japan holds
a uniquely protectionist  niche in  world  rice markets, as  well
in  a variety of  other  agricultural  commodities.  While
generally acknowledging  the  importance of  liberalization in
principle, the  Japanese have clearly opposed  greater market
orientation in  practice.  Part  of  the  Japanese approach  has
been  to place  great  emphasis on  the non-economic objectives  of
farm policies,  including rural  employment, environmental
quality, and  "food security."  This  last point is  of particular
importance  in  the  context  of Japanese attitudes  to  dependence
on foreign suppliers  of  rice.  Japan often cites the  experience
of  1973, when the Nixon administration embargoed shipments  of
U.S. soybeans  in  the  face of  a short crop  and  skyrocketing U.S.
prices,  as evidence  of  the  untrustworthiness of  foreign
suppliers.  It  would  appear  that  some form of GATT binding  to
honor  contracted-for shipments will be  important to  Japanese
willingness to  concede to the  demands of  the U.S.,  which  so  far
have met considerable  resistance.
Clearly, the distance between  these positions  is  great.
Whether  the ministers meeting in  Monreal  will be  able to begin
a process  of  reconciliation remains  an open question.
Especially as  the Reagan administration complete its  tenure,
there  will  be a strong tendency to  "wait and see"  what a new
administration will bring.  While  understandable, there  remain
basic reasons why the U.S.  approach  to agricultural trade
reform should not  be greatly  altered, regardless  of  the  outcome
in  the November  elections.  Nor  is  it  likely  to  fade
permanently away as a key  issue,  despite many politicians'
ardent wish  that  it would.
The  first  is  the  budgetary cost  of  current policies,  which have
accounted  for two-thirds  of  the  total  expenditures  of  the
European Community, and  over one-sixth of  the amount  of  the
U.S. budget  deficit.  While these costs  have moderated
somewhat,  they remain the  object of public criticism for  the
unfairness with which program benefits  are distributed, and
their adverse employment  and environmental  impacts.  The  second
reason the  battle for  agricultural policy reform is  likely to
continue  is  the  central  role of  the U.S.  agricultural proposal
to  U.S.  strategy  in the Round as  a whole, which has  14 other
negotiating areas linked,  in one  way or  another,  to- 16  -
agriculture.  The U.S.  is pushing  reforms  in GATT affecting
areas such  as  services,  intellectual property  rights, and  the
capacity of  the GATT system to  resolve disputes, worth
literally trillions  of dollars  in  U.S.  business.  The  fact that
agriculture is  central  to the Uruguay Round strategy will make
trade-offs between  it  and  these other  areas crucial to  the
ultimate  "package" which the U.S.  takes away  from the
bargaining  table.  To substantially revise  the U.S.  approach  to
agriculture would upset  these linkages,  threatening the entire
package sought by U.S.  negotiators.  In  short,  the U.S.  has
drawn the  attention of  other GATT parties  to  the need to remove
the waivers  and exceptions  behind which American agricultural
interests have sought protection  in  the past,  assuming these
parties are prepared to  offer significant  concessions of  their
own.  It will  not be allowed  to back  down from this position
without major negotiating losses.
In  addition to  these negotiating factors,  the  impact  of  U.S.
leadership  in  the Uruguay Round cannot be  divorced  from the
actions  of  individuals and groups  in  the American political
process.  Regardless of party,  the  new administration will  not
be  able  to  avoid the problems  of  agriculture.  A  new president
will find  agriculture a  lynchpin  in  a  round of  multilateral
trade  talks  in progress,  the failure of which would have global
economic  implications.  In  this global  economic environment,
any new administration will find  continuation of  the  basic U.S.
position on agriculture  important.  The  combination of
excessive budget deficits  at home, and  the need for market
creation  abroad, will dictate  reduced agricultural  spending on
surplus commodities,  and increased economic  activity with
developing countries, both  of which may  be materially advanced
in  the  GATT.
There are, moreover,  a wide  range of  domestic agricultural
interests for  whom the U.S. proposal  offers  the hope  of  a
stronger, more independent agriculture,  less dependent  on the
government  subsidies that  have  turned individualistic and
self-reliant Americans  into virtual wards of  the  state.  It
bears  noting that  the U.S. proposal  has  been endorsed by  a wide
range  of U.S.  farm groups,  on  the assumption that  other  GATT
members  reform their  agriculture  in  tandem with  the U.S.
Nor,  in  a  negotiating setting, can  the particular personalities
be discounted as  factors in  the  eventual outcome.  The  current
United States Trade Representative, Clayton Yeutter,  is  an
agriculturalist by background and training, whose  familiarity
with farm programs  has  been a  major factor  in  resolving a
variety of  agricultural  disputes before GATT, and  giving the
Uruguay Round  a major  agricultural thrust.  Yet  regardless  of
the personal  inclinations of  the  next USTR, the  agricultural
issue  is  now placed at  the  center  of progress  in  the  Uruguay- 17  -
Round, and will  be ignored  only at  the peril of  international
economic  relations.
V.
In  the final  analysis,  despite  its  importance, the assault  on
agricultural protectionsim faces  long  odds.  Politically, the
most  important question  remains  the capacity  of  the  new
administration, whatever  its party,  to maintain the momentum of
the first  two years  of  the  negotiation.  This may be  less
difficult  than  imagined by  some pessimists, especially because
the  negotiations will  impinge  upon and affect the  1990 Farm
Bill.  By drawing the political economy of  trade together with
that  of  the  1990  legislative  debate, the  negotiations will
become  even more important  to domestic  interests than they are
today, focussing  attention  in farm states on progress in
Geneva.
Whether  this  attention will be  constructive in  advancing more
liberal trade in agriculture, however,  is  a more difficult
question.  As  Paarlberg  and Hathaway  have argued,  the
interaction  of  multilateral trade negotiations  and  domestic
policies can  lead to mutually reinforcing  reforms.  But  a
reverse dynamic--toward  less  liberal  trade  and greater
protectionism--is also possible  if  progress  in Geneva  appears
stalled. 6 Here the  distance between the  U.S.  and European
proposals  looms  as  a major challenge  for  the new
administration, as well for  the December meeting  in Montreal.
The European position is  set  in  the mold of  the price  supports
and export subsidies of  the CAP.  Its  new budget gives  it
"deeper pockets" should a subsidy war  erupt anew.  As  for  the
U.S. position,  its strength--uncompromising support  for
liberalization--is  also its weakness,  since  any attempt  to  come
down from so  lofty a perch encourages  others to pursue more
market-sharing approaches.  Yet  failure  to come  down allows
those less enthralled with liberalization to decry the
continuing  lack  of  "realism"  in  the  U.S. proposal,  and  its
distance from our own agricultural status  quo.  In  this
situation, there  are  strong incentives  for  either  the
uncompromising advocates of  liberalization  (the U.S.)  or  the
compromising advocates of  realism  (the E.C.)  to  walk out  of  the
negotiation, maintaining that  they have held the  high or
realistic ground  respectively.  The problem  is  then one with
which a new administration will have to deal.
Yet there remain certain areas  in which  discussion and
potential progress  is  ultimately possible.  First,  it  appears
that  "decoupled" direct payments  to farmers  will  remain the
principal  alternative to current policies,  although moving  in
this  direction will be difficult.  In  order  to make it
operational from a negotiating perspective, decoupled policy- 18  -
alternatives must be  clarified so that  affected farmers
understand what such  an approach  would mean.  Apart from these
domestic program changes,  the  trade effects  of agricultural
policies must be ordered according  to their  relative  distorting
effects,  allowing acceptable bounds to  be established as  a
basis  for further negotiation.
Second,  social welfare objectives of agricultural policies will
inevitably  be a part of  the  discussion in GATT.  These  issues
may appear tangential,  but can be  crucial to  "selling" policy
reforms with domestic  interests.  In  the U.S.  case,  the
agriculture committees  of  the  House and  Senate must be  able to
justify to  their constituents  (commodity and consumer  groups)
that  the U.S.  has  gotten a "fair deal"  in GATT.  If this  deal
involves  direct  income supports  to  farmers,  then  the approach
must find acceptance with farmers and the nonfarm public
alike.  Linking  it  to environmntal policy reforms  (in  the 1990
Farm Bill  and elsewhere)  can not only enhance  its attraction,
but  its  impact on  rural development  and employment  objectives.
Similar programs  can assist European  and even Japanese
politicians  to sell  direct income supports  to farmers.  Nor  can
the  issue of  food security be  sidestepped, especially in
Japan.  It  will be  important to guarantee supplies  to major
importers as part of  a final agreement,  consistent with  the
rules of  GATT.
Third, the  issue of  LDC treatment  is  likely to remain  a
ticklish matter.  Insofar as possible, LDCs will be  brought
into  the Round with promises of market access  and, if
necessary, special  and  differential treatment.  But  there are
real  risks  in  this approach.  If  the LDCs  are exempted from
GATT disciplines in  agriculture that  can  be agreed to  by  the
U.S.,  the  E.C.  and Japan, then why should the big three  players
trouble with multilateral negotiations at  all?  In  this
respect,  short  term gains by LDCs may wind up as  long  term
losses,  as  the major players move outside  of GATT to  conduct
agricultural negotiations, closing off LDC market access.  If
LDCs are  exempted  from disciplines on  agricultural pricing
policies  that  tax producers and have been criticized by  the  IMF
and World Bank,  GATT will  have undercut these other
multilateral  institutions.  On the other hand,  a real
opportunity exists  to bring LDCs  into the  same framework  of
increased market-orientation as  the  developed countries  (albeit
in  different ways).  The  role of  GATT in  improving LDC market
signalling to  increase output by  eliminating taxes  on farmers,
and  reducing  trade distortions  arising from import  substitution
strategies, may be even more  important to growth  in  world trade
than  reforms  in developed agricultural  economies.
Still,  given the profound difficulties facing agricultural
policies, and the entrenched interests,  the temptation to  blame- 19  -
foreign governments for  failed domestic policies  is  strong.
Agricultural  negotiators  in  both the United  States  and European
Community can engage  in  recriminatory charges  and
countercharges, followed  by  renewed subsidy wars, without
serious short  term losses  in domestic  political terms.
Similarly,  Japanese policy makers can  continue erroneously to
tout  self-sufficiency as  the only  road to  food security, using
the experience of  embargoes as  justification for  the
perfidiousness of  foreign suppliers.  Net  importers  in  the
developing countries can  rally their  constituents by  laying  the
blame  (with reason)  for  low agricultural prices  on the  North,
yet failing to acknowledge  that a wide variety  of distortions
in  their  own economies  discriminate against  farmers and  in
favor of  urban elites.
This style of  negotiation is hardly new, and  is  part of  what
fuels pessimism over multilateral  institutions  such  as  GATT.
Yet  it  is  this  institutional setting  that provides  the only
current hope  in forcing  reforms.  Writing  in  the wake  of  the
disastrous Versailles  Conference in  1919 of  the onerous  impact
that  reparations payments would have on the  economic  recovery
of  Europe,  J.M. Keynes noted  that  retaliation would provide a
fertile breeding  ground for  protectionism, economic depression,
and political  extremism.
We may still  have  time  to reconsider  our course and  view
the world with new eyes.  For  the  immediate future  events
are  taking charge,  and  the near  destiny of  Europe is  no
longer  in  the hands  of  any man.  The  events  of  the  coming
year  will not be  shaped by  the deliberate  acts of  statesmen
but by  the  hidden currents, flowing  continually beneath the
surface of  political history,  of which no  one can  predict
the  outcome.  In one way only can we  influence  these hidden
currents,--by setting in motion those forces  of  instruction
and  imagination which  change opinion. 7
Whether  the  assault  on agricultural  protectionism will  succeed
in  the Uruguay Round will  depend, like  earlier conferences,
less  on diplomatic  skill  than political  courage.  It  is  high
time  that the myths  surrounding current agricultural programs
are  cast aside, and that  realistic programs  are put  in place
that  assure income  security without  locking in  signals  that
distort markets  and destroy incentives of  farmers around the
world to produce what is  in  fact  scarce.  But  political  courage
may be the  scarcest commodity of  all.- 20  -
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